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T
W
I 
I. THE SYRIAN CRISIS 
 
    
he Syrian crisis is a humanitarian catastrophe with devastating reverber-
ant effects. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) charac-
terizes the conflict “now in its sixth year . . . [a]s the largest and most com-
plex humanitarian crisis in the world, with no end in sight.”1 Statistics on 
the direct effects of the conflict are shocking. Estimates of the number of 
deaths since March 2011 vary, but as recently as April 2016 in the context 
of attacks on the northern Syrian city of Aleppo, the United Nations and 
Arab League Envoy for Syria, Staffan de Mistura, claimed that the toll had 
climbed to 400,000.2 While de Mistura conceded that his figure was a per-
sonal one and did not represent an official UN estimate, his claim is cor-
roborated by the Syrian Center for Policy Research (SCPR), which in 2015 
estimated a death toll of 470,000.3 The UN officially stopped counting 
deaths in Syria in 2014, presumably because of a lack of access to areas in-
volving intense hostilities, so the previous UN estimate of 250,000 deaths 
no longer reflects reality. According to the SCPR’s analysis, 400,000 deaths 
have resulted from hostilities and an additional 70,000 have resulted indi-
rectly from the collapse of Syria’s health system and consequent lack of 
medical treatment, poor sanitation, the spreading of communicable diseas-
es, scarcity of food and consequent malnutrition.4 The SCPR also estimates 
that almost two million additional Syrians have been wounded in the con-
flict5 and, given the relative lack of effective medical care and the ongoing 
intensive military hostilities in the country, such figures suggest that the 
ultimate death toll will continue to rise. 
                                                                                                                      
1. Syria Crisis, ICRC, https://www.icrc.org/en/where-we-work/middle-east/syria 
(last visited Sept. 13, 2016). 
2. See Syria Death Toll: UN Envoy Estimates 400,000 Killed, AL JAZEERA (Apr. 24, 2016), 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/04/staffan-de-mistura-400000-killed-syria-civil-
war-160423055735629.html. 
3. SYRIAN CENTER FOR POLICY RESEARCH, CONFRONTING FRAGMENTATION! 61 
(2015), http://scpr-syria.org/publications/confronting-fragmentation/ (follow SCPR-re-
port-Confronting-fragmentation-2015-EN.pdf hyperlink) [hereinafter SCPR REPORT]. For 
an analysis of the report’s findings, see Priyanka Boghani, A Staggering New Death Toll for 
Syria’s War: 470,000, FRONTLINE (Feb. 11, 2016), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontli 
ne/article/a-staggering-new-death-toll-for-syrias-war-470000/. 
4. SCPR REPORT, supra note 3, at 51–52; Boghani, supra note 3. 
5. SCPR REPORT, supra note 3, at 51. 
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The numbers of dead and wounded reflect a devastating aspect of the 
conflict, but other statistics reveal compounded human misery. The ICRC 
estimates that eight million Syrians have become internally displaced within 
their own war-torn country6 and the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees reports that an additional 4.8 million Syrians are now regis-
tered as refugees, the overwhelming bulk of them in neighboring Turkey, 
Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq.7 The combined total of Syrians forced to leave 
their homes and livelihoods is now close to, or in excess of, half the entire 
population of the country. These statistics reflect a mind-numbing scale of 
devastation, yet they remain merely symptomatic of the comprehensive 
disintegration of Syria as an independent nation-State.  
The conflict has destroyed Syria’s economy, ruined production, forced 
dramatic increases in prices of basic necessities and dragged large numbers 
of the population into extreme poverty. The SCPR estimates that 70 per-
cent of the population no longer have the means to provide the essentials 
for survival and so are dependent upon humanitarian aid and assistance 
merely to survive.8 That harsh reality has produced insatiable dependency 
and imposed a massive economic burden on major donor nations. Effec-
tive central governance is no longer exercised in many regions and various 
parties to the conflicts, all vying for increased control over territory, are the 
only entities capable of exercising authority and control. Government ser-
vices are in abeyance, formal education is haphazard or non-existent and 
the health services that have persisted are understaffed, inadequately re-
sourced and often deliberately targeted in attacks. 
Quite apart from the overwhelming humanitarian need within Syria and 
the challenges of gaining access for the delivery of relief convoys, the hu-
manitarian, social and economic impacts outside the country have also 
been overwhelming. The flood of refugees from Syria has inundated 
neighboring countries, stretching their limited resources. Tens of thousands 
of Syrian refugees have attempted to flee beyond nearby States to Europe, 
exacerbating the regional political and economic crisis involving already 
large numbers of asylum seekers from North African conflicts.  
The Syrian crisis was initiated during the so-called “Arab Spring,” a 
term coined to describe popular protests in a succession of Middle Eastern 
                                                                                                                      
6. Syria Crisis, supra note 1. 
7. See Syrian Regional Refugee Response: Inter-Agency Information Sharing Portal, UNHCR, 
http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php (updated as of Sept. 4, 2016). 
8. SCPR REPORT, supra note 3, at 46, Boghani, supra note 3. 
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States against dictatorial rule.9 Even in those States in which past repressive 
dictatorships have been removed, however, there has been little, if any, ev-
idence of a triumph of liberalism and new-found personal and collective 
freedoms. Instead, regime removals seem to have either unleashed pre-
existing animosities along tribal, local or religious lines, and/or created 
power vacuums which different interest groups have been quick to exploit.  
In Syria, however, where the regime of Bashar al-Assad has tenaciously 
clung to power, the carnage has been prodigious. When the popular revolt 
in Syria commenced in March 2011, al-Assad responded as the al-Assads 
and their Alawite minority have routinely done.10 Bashar al-Assad learned 
from his father and adopted a similar approach to that used in Hama in 
1982 in attempting to crush the emergent insurrection in 2011. The differ-
ence this time around compared to uprisings in the past was that the rebel-
lion was popular and widespread—not limited to a single city—and the 
regime was unable to crush it at its inception. The conflict in Syria has esca-
lated in intensity and morphed in complexity ever since. 
The devastation wrought upon the country has been, and continues to 
be, characterized by egregious violations of international law. At the time 
this article was finalized, for example, the international media was reporting 
that rebel-held eastern Aleppo’s sole remaining medical facility had been 
targeted and destroyed11—just like all other medical facilities before it 
throughout the brutal siege of that northern Syrian city. In the maelstrom 
of egregious violations of the law by many of the parties to the conflicts, 
international law’s constraining influence appears weak at best. Prodigious 
effort has been expended to exhort restraint, to demand compliance with 
                                                                                                                      
9. The Western media has been credited with coining the term “Arab Spring,” but the 
term has also been criticized as overly simplistic. For an explanation of the terminology 
and criticisms of it, see Definition of the Arab Spring, ABOUT, http://middleeast.about.com 
/od/humanrightsdemocracy/a/Definition-Of-The-Arab-Spring.htm. 
10. For example, in 1982 Hafez al-Assad turned the Syrian military on his own people 
in Hama following the emergence of a dissident armed force there. The retribution was 
withering and resulted in an estimated 20,000 dead—a crushing lesson to any others who 
might dare to attempt insurrection against the regime. For discussion of the Hama attacks 
see, e.g., Jason Rodrigues, 1982: Syria’s President Hafez al-Assad Crushes Rebellion in Hama, 
THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 1, 2011),  http://www.theguardian.com/theguardian/from-the-arc 
hive-blog/2011/aug/01/hama-syria-massacre-1982-archive; Deborah Amos, Thirty Years 
Later, Photos Emerge from Killings in Syria, NPR NEWS (Feb. 2, 2012), http://www.npr.org 
/2012/02/01/146235292/30-years-later-photos-emerge-from-killings-in-syria. 
11. Battle for Aleppo: “All Hospitals are Destroyed,” AL JAZEERA (Nov. 20, 2016), http: 
//www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/11/battle-aleppo-hospitals-destroyed-161119143126 
110.html. 
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international legal obligations and to insist on accountability for those re-
sponsible for flagrant violations. Prodigious effort also has been expended 
on the negotiation of ceasefire agreements, on the declaration of safe corri-
dors for flight of besieged civilians, on securing guarantees for humanitari-
an access and on provision of emergency assistance. But after six long years 
of the crisis, there is no apparent abatement in the infliction of brutality 
and the international community’s impotence to stop it.   
The one violation of international law that has triggered a more sub-
stantive response has been the alleged use of chemical weapons in the Syri-
an conflicts. The UN Security Council has not only condemned the use of 
chemical weapons but established investigative mechanisms jointly with the 
Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in The 
Hague to send investigators to Syria. The Security Council has met repeat-
edly to condemn the use of chemical weapons and to demand that those 
responsible be held accountable. I am intrigued by the disparity of response 
to alleged chemical weapon use on one hand and to virtually all other egre-
gious atrocities on the other. My intention here is to expose the disparities 
of approach and attempt not only to explain reasons for disparate respons-
es, but also to identify some key emergent implications for international 
law.  
Ultimately, it is clear that the apparent disparities of approach are less 
stark than they initially appear and that for all the effort to identify those 
parties responsible for the violation of the prohibition on the use of chemi-
cal weapons, the international community is no closer to individual ac-
countability for those crimes as for any other war crimes perpetrated 
throughout the Syrian crisis.  
 
II. USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND MULTILATERAL RESPONSES 
 
When the situation in Syria began spiraling out of control in the transition 
from widespread protests against the regime of Bashar al-Assad to all-out 
civil war, concerns were raised about Syria’s stockpile of chemical weapons 
and of the possibilities either of the weapons being used by the al-Assad 
regime or of those weapons falling into the hands of terrorist groups.12 The 
Syrian government had never explicitly confirmed its possession of chemi-
cal weapons, but “in July 2012, implicitly admitted what had long been sus-
                                                                                                                      
12. Syria Chemical Weapons Allegations, BBC (Oct. 31, 2013), http://www.bbc.com/ 
news/world-middle-east-22557347. 
 
 
 
Chemical Weapons and Other Atrocities                                                   Vol. 92 
 
517 
 
 
 
 
 
 
pected by experts in the field of chemical weapons proliferation—that Syria 
had stocks of chemical weapons.”13 Several weeks later on August 20, Pres-
ident Obama made his famous “red line” statement about Syria’s chemical 
weapons. At a White House press conference, he was asked about the 
safekeeping of the stockpile of Syrian chemical weapons and stated that: 
 
We cannot have a situation where chemical or biological weapons are fall-
ing into the hands of the wrong people. We have been very clear to the 
Assad regime, but also to other players on the ground, that a red line for 
us is we start seeing a whole bunch of chemical weapons moving around 
or being utilized. That would change my calculus. That would change my 
equation.14 
 
Tragically it did not take long for these early concerns to materialize 
with the first allegations of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian con-
flict. The Syrian government and rebel forces each accused the other of 
responsibility for separate chemical weapons attacks on March 19, 2013 in 
the Khan al-Assal neighborhood in Aleppo and in Al-Otaybeh in Damas-
cus.15 Other allegations of chemical weapons use followed shortly thereaf-
ter in relation to attacks in Adra on March 24, Sheikh Maqsoud on April 13 
and Saraqeb on April 29.16 On March 20, the day after the Khan al-Assal 
and Al-Otaybeh attacks, the Syrian government requested the UN Secre-
tary-General (UNSG) to launch an official investigation under the auspices 
of the “Secretary-General’s Mechanism”—an authority to investigate al-
leged uses of chemical or biological weapons conferred by UN General 
Assembly Resolution 42/37C in 1987 and reaffirmed in 1988 by UN Secu-
rity Council Resolution 620.17  
Following finalization of arrangements between the UN and the Syrian 
government on August 14, 2013, the UNSG’s Mission to Investigate Alle-
                                                                                                                      
13. Id. 
14. Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by the President to the 
White House Press Corps (Aug. 20, 2012), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2012/08/20/remarks-president-white-house-press-corps. 
15. Syria Chemical Weapons Allegations, supra note 12. 
16. Id. 
17. G.A. Res. 42/37C (Nov. 30, 1987); S.C. Res. 620 (Aug. 26, 1988). See also UN Of-
fice for Disarmament Affairs, Frequently Asked Questions About the United Nations Mission to 
Investigate the Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic (Sept. 20, 
2013), http://unoda-web.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/FAQ_Syria_ 
CW_updated_20092013.pdf [hereinafter Frequently Asked Questions]. 
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gations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic was 
established and the investigative team arrived in Damascus just a few days 
later on August 18.18 While the investigators were still in situ preparing to 
commence investigations into the earlier incidents, allegations of a large-
scale chemical weapons attack on the Damascus suburb of Ghouta 
emerged.19 The Ghouta attack, involving many more victims than previous 
attacks, captured the international community’s attention. Photos and vid-
eo footage were posted online revealing graphic images of victims strug-
gling to breathe, experiencing convulsions, receiving treatment in over-
crowded and makeshift hospitals and of row after row of dead bodies, in-
cluding many children.  
The UNSG’s investigative team turned their attention immediately and 
exclusively to Ghouta and in just three weeks produced a report on the at-
tack which they transmitted to the UNSG on September 13.20 The report 
concluded that surface-to-surface rockets containing the nerve agent sarin 
were used to attack “civilians, including children, on a relatively large 
scale.”21 The report did not attribute responsibility for the attack, but the 
UNSG was scathing in condemning 
 
in the strongest possible terms the use of chemical weapons and believes 
that this act is a war crime and grave violation of the 1925 Protocol for 
the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other 
Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare and other rules of cus-
tomary international law. The international community has a moral re-
sponsibility to hold accountable those responsible and for ensuring that 
chemical weapons can never re-emerge as an instrument of warfare.22  
 
While the UN investigation was in progress, the United States and Rus-
sia were intimately involved in influencing President al-Assad to accede to 
the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)23 and to surrender his stockpile 
                                                                                                                      
18. Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 17. 
19. Syria Chemical Weapons Allegations, supra note 12. 
20. See UN Mission to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the 
Syrian Arab Republic, Report on Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the 
Ghouta Area of Damascus on 21 August 2013, U.N. Doc. A/67/997–S/2013/553 (Sept. 
16, 2013), http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2013/553 [hereinafter 
Use of Chemical Weapons Report].  
21. Id. ¶¶ 27–28. 
22. Id., UN Secretary-General’s transmittal note, ¶ 1. 
23. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and 
Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993, 1974 U.N.T.S. 45.  
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of chemical weapons for supervised destruction. Marie Jacobsson provides 
an excellent analysis of the critical steps which led Syria to lodge its instru-
ment of accession.24 Russia had demonstrated its determination to block 
any UN Security Council authorization of forceful measures against the 
regime of Bashar al-Assad and so the United States was threatening unilat-
eral military action against the al-Assad regime. While the international 
community was waiting for release of the findings of the UN investigation, 
it became clear that the investigators had unearthed incontrovertible proof 
of chemical weapon use and, as Jacobsson explains, rumors circulated that 
the investigative report might name the al-Assad regime as the responsible 
party.25 On September 9, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry responded to 
questioning at a press conference in London by stating that al-Assad had 
one week to hand over his entire stockpile of chemical weapons to stave 
off a U.S. attack against him.26 Moscow, presumably desirous of avoiding 
U.S. military action against the regime, successfully pressured al-Assad to 
forego his chemical weapons capability. On September 12, Syria an-
nounced its intention to accede to the CWC and actually deposited its in-
strument of accession with the UNSG’s Treaty Secretariat just two days 
later.27 On that same day, the United States and Russia announced their 
agreement on a Joint Framework for Elimination of Syrian Chemical 
Weapons for consideration by the Executive Council of the OPCW.28 
With the United States, Russia and the al-Assad regime in unusual 
unison, developments at the multilateral level moved apace. The Executive 
                                                                                                                      
24. Marie Jacobsson, Syria and the Issue of Chemical Weapons: A Snapshot of a Legal Time-
Frame: The United Nations Security Council Resolution (2118) and the OPCW Executive Council 
Decision, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CHANGING PERCEPTIONS OF SECURITY: LIBER 
AMICORUM SAID MAHMOUDI 134 (Jonas Ebbesson, Marie Jacobsson, Mark Klamberg, 
David Langlet & Pål Wrange eds., 2014). 
25. Id. at 134–35. 
26. Id. at 135. 
27. See Use of Chemical Weapons Report, supra note 20, UN Secretary-General’s 
transmittal note, ¶ 3. 
28. Media Note, U.S. Department of State, Framework for Elimination of Syrian 
Chemical Weapons (Sept. 14, 2013), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/09/214 
247.htm. The text of the Framework Agreement was transmitted to the UNSG on Sep-
tember 19 and designated as an official UN document on September 24. See Permanent 
Representative of the Russian Federation to the UN and the Permanent Representative of 
the United States of America to the UN, Letter dated Sept. 19, 2013 addressed to the Sec-
retary-General, Annex, U.N. Doc. A/68/398–S/2013/565 (Sept. 24, 2013), http://www.s 
ecuritycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9% 
7D/s_2013_565.pdf.   
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Council of the OPCW met in The Hague on September 27 and adopted a 
formal Decision on the Destruction of Syrian Chemical Weapons (OPCW 
Decision).29 This decision outlined the Executive Council’s key require-
ments and timelines for Syrian compliance with its CWC obligations, in-
cluding full disclosure and relevant declarations (within weeks) and destruc-
tion of chemical agents, material and equipment (within months).30 The 
UN Security Council met later that same day and adopted Resolution 
211831—arguably the most strongly worded Council resolution on the Syri-
an conflict to that date. The Council determined, inter alia, that any use of 
chemical weapons constitutes a threat to international peace and security; 
condemned any use of chemical weapons in Syria, including the Ghouta 
attack on August 21; expressed its strong conviction that those responsible 
for the use of chemical weapons in Syria should be held accountable; en-
dorsed the decision of the OPCW Executive Council on special procedures 
for the expeditious destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons program; and 
demanded that Syria cooperate fully with all aspects of the OPCW Deci-
sion. 
To implement Resolution 2118, the OPCW-UN Joint Mission for the 
Elimination of the Chemical Weapons Programme of the Syrian Arab Re-
public was formally established on October 16, 2013, although an OPCW-
UN advance team had already arrived in country on October 1.32 The Joint 
Mission conducted its operations through the end of September 2014 and 
during that period of almost twelve months it 
 
successfully verified the destruction of 13 mobile and stationary chemical 
weapons production, mixing and filling facilities; the destruction of un-
filled chemical munitions and isopropanol declared by the Syrian Arab 
Republic; and the removal of chemical-warfare agents and precursors 
from the territory of Syria for their destruction outside that country.33 
                                                                                                                      
29. OPCW Executive Council Decision, Destruction of Syrian Chemical Weapons, 
OPCW Doc. EC-M-33/DEC.1 (Sept. 27, 2013), https://www.opcw.org/fileadmin/OP 
CW/EC/M-33/ecm33dec01_e_.pdf. 
30. Id. ¶ 1. 
31. S.C. Res. 2118 (Sept. 27, 2013). 
32. See About OPCW-Joint Mission: Background, OPCW-UN JOINT MISSION, http://op 
cw.unmissions.org/AboutOPCWUNJointMission/Background.aspx (last visited Sept. 13, 
2016). 
33. RALF TRAPP, LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE OPCW MISSION IN SYRIA: REPORT, 
¶ 1 (Dec. 16, 2015), https://www.opcw.org/fileadmin/OPCW/PDF/Lessons_learned_f 
rom_the_OPCW_Mission_in_Syria.pdf. 
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In addition to the achievements of the Joint Mission, Ralf Trapp 
claimed in December 2015 that the destruction of the remaining chemical 
weapons productions facilities in Syria was ongoing and would be “com-
pleted soon.”34 On January 4, 2016, the OPCW announced the completion 
of the destruction of all chemical weapons declared by Syria.35 
The OPCW-UN Joint Mission concluded its work despite the ongoing 
Syrian conflict and with all the resultant security, logistical and political 
challenges that such a volatile environment presented. Trapp characterized 
the entire enterprise as a “test of the [OPCW] Secretariat’s ability to im-
plement a complex and highly demanding task under extremely difficult 
circumstances”36 and the UNSG, Ban Ki Moon, congratulated the Joint 
Mission coordinator and the OPCW and UN staff members on successful-
ly completing their work “under extremely challenging and complex cir-
cumstances.”37 However, despite the significance of all the Joint Mission 
achieved, allegations were raised early in 2014, well before the completion 
of its work, about ongoing use of chlorine gas in Syria.38 
On April 29, 2014, the OPCW Executive Council announced the es-
tablishment of a fact-finding mission (FFM) mandated to establish the facts 
surrounding allegations of the use of toxic chemicals, specifically chlorine, 
for hostile purposes in Syria.39 The FFM presented quarterly reports, in 
                                                                                                                      
34. Id. 
35. Press Release, OPCW, Destruction of Syrian Chemical Weapons Completed (Jan. 
4, 2016), https://www.opcw.org/news/article/destruction-of-syrian-chemical-weapons-
completed/. 
36. Id. 
37. UN Chief Commends Special Coordinator and Her Team on Successful Completion of 
OPCW-UN Joint Mission, OPCW-UN JOINT MISSION (Oct. 1, 2014), http://opcw.unmi 
ssions.org/AboutOPCWUNJointMission/tabid/54/ctl/Details/mid/651/ItemID/343/
Default.aspx. 
38. See Ninety-Six Percent of Syria’s Declared Chemical Weapons Destroyed—UN-OPCW 
Chief, OPCW-UN JOINT MISSION (Sept. 4, 2014), http://opcw.unmissions.org/ 
AboutOPCWUNJointMission/tabid/54/ctl/Details/mid/651/ItemID/341/Default.aspx 
(comments by the U.S. Permanent Representative to the UN, Samantha Power, raising 
concerns about the alleged use of chlorine and that “the elimination effort is not com-
plete”). 
39. Press Release, OPCW, OPCW to Undertake Fact-Finding Mission in Syria on Al-
leged Chlorine Gas Attacks (Apr. 29, 2014), https://www.opcw.org/news/article/opcw-
to-undertake-fact-finding-mission-in-syria-on-alleged-chlorine-gas-attacks/. For the text of 
the mandate, see Third Report of the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria, OPCW, 
OPCW Doc. S/1230/2014 (Dec. 18, 2014),  http://photos.state gov/libraries/netherland 
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June, September and December 2014 and concluded, at least in the second 
and third reports, with “a high degree of confidence that chlorine ha[d] 
been used as a weapon” in the Syrian villages of Talmenes, Al Tamanah, 
and Kafr Zita.40 These findings constituted the first confirmed use of 
chemical weapons on the territory of a State party to the CWC and, alt-
hough the FFM was not mandated to attribute responsibility to specific 
parties to the conflicts or to specific individuals, the conclusion that chemi-
cal weapons had been used was troubling. In addressing the OPCW Execu-
tive Council in response to the second report, the Director-General 
claimed that it 
 
is a tragic irony that a hundred years after chlorine was first used on the 
battlefield, its misuse to kill and terrorize unarmed civilians has again raised 
its ugly head. The OPCW must show zero tolerance for any actions that 
threaten the norm against the use of any chemical as a weapon.41  
 
Following the presentation of the third report in December 2014, the 
OPCW Executive Council met in February 2015 and adopted a decision 
condemning the use of chemical weapons as a violation of international law 
and confirming that those responsible should be held accountable.42 One 
month later, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 220943 condemn-
ing the use of chemical weapons, endorsing the decision of the OPCW Ex-
ecutive Council to continue the work of the FFM, demanding that those 
responsible for the ongoing use of chemical weapons be held accountable 
and threatening measures pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN Charter in 
the event of future non-compliance with earlier Council resolutions. 
Despite the adoption of Resolution 2209, allegations of ongoing use of 
chlorine persisted. On March 16, 2015, for example, only ten days after the 
adoption of Resolution 2209, chlorine was allegedly used in an attack on 
the Syrian town of Sarmin. U.S. Secretary of State Kerry was quick to con-
                                                                                                                      
s/328666/pdfs/THIRDREPORTOFTHEOPCWFACTFINDINGMISSIONINSYRIA.
pdf [hereinafter FFM Third Report]. 
40. See FFM Third Report, supra note 39, Note by the Technical Secretariat, ¶ 3. 
41. Press Release, OPCW, Executive Council Discusses Findings of Fact-Finding 
Mission (Sept. 26, 2014), https://www.opcw.org/news/article/executive-council-discuss 
es-findings-of-fact-finding-mission/. 
42. OPCW Executive Council Decision, Reports of the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission 
in Syria, OPCW Doc. No. EC-M-48/DEC.1 (Feb. 4, 2015), https://www.opcw.org/file 
admin/OPCW/EC/M-48/ecm48dec01_e_.pdf. 
43. S.C. Res. 2209 (Mar. 6, 2015). 
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demn the attack, indicating that if the allegations were correct, this most 
recent violation of international law (the CWC and Resolution 2209) was 
completely unacceptable.44 Secretary Kerry called for a quick and effective 
investigation to hold those responsible to account. Over the next two 
months the number of chlorine attacks allegedly escalated dramatically (alt-
hough the numbers of victims of such attacks were typically small)45 lead-
ing the Security Council to adopt even stronger measures. Resolution 2235 
was adopted unanimously on August 746 following agreement between the 
United States and Russia on the draft text.47 The Council reiterated its con-
demnation; expressed its determination to identify those responsible and 
reiterated its demand that they be held accountable; and established an 
OPCW-UN Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM).  
The JIM’s mandate is stronger than that given to the OPCW FFM in 
that it includes the mandate not only to investigate allegations of chemical 
weapons use, but also “to identify to the greatest extent feasible, individu-
als, entities, groups or governments who were perpetrators, organisers, 
sponsors or otherwise involved in the use of chemicals as weapons, includ-
ing chlorine or any other toxic chemical.”48 The UNSG declared the JIM 
fully operational on November 1349 and its work has been ongoing since. 
The head of JIM, Virginia Gamba, presented its initial report to the Se-
curity Council in a confidential session in February 2016. According to the 
official UN press release, the JIM reported on its detailed review of the 
OPCW FFM’s findings and listed seven incidents identified by the FFM 
and prioritized by the JIM for investigation.50 Since the presentation of an 
                                                                                                                      
44. Press Statement, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, Allegations of Chemical 
Weapons Use in Sarmin, Syria (Mar. 19, 2015), http://www.state.gov/secretary/rem 
arks/2015/03/239510.htm. 
45. See, e.g., Kareem Shaheen, Assad Regime Accused of 35 Chlorine Attacks Since Mid-
March, THE GUARDIAN (May 24, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015 
/may/24/syria-regime-accused-of-using-chlorine-bombs-on-civilians. 
46. S.C. Res. 2235 (Aug. 7, 2015). 
47. See Michael R. Gordon, US and Russia to Back U.N. Vote on Chemical Attacks in Syr-
ia, NEW YORK TIMES (Aug. 6, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/07/world/as 
ia/syria-chemical-attacks-un-resolution.html?_r=0. 
48. S.C. Res. 2235, supra note 46, ¶¶ 1, 4–5.  
49. See Press Release, United  Nations, United Nations Signs Status of Mission 
Agreement with Syria, U.N. Press Release DC/3596 (Dec. 11, 2015), http://www.un. 
org/press/en/2015/dc3596.doc.htm. 
50.  Press Release, United Nations, Joint Investigative Mechanism Presents its First 
Report to Security Council, U.N. Press Release DC/3608 (Feb. 22, 2016), http://ww 
w.un.org/press/en/2016/dc3608.doc.htm. 
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initial report to the Security Council, the JIM has now completed its inves-
tigation of nine specific incidents and has presented its second51 and third52 
reports to the Council. In its third report the JIM explained its investigative 
methodology and outlined its findings in relation to the specific incidents. 
The JIM reached conclusions on the “(a) date and time; (b) weather condi-
tions; (c) impact location; (d) munition (e.g., remnants); (e) delivery method 
(e.g., means and direction); (f) damage and effects (e.g., on buildings, the 
environment, flora and fauna); and (g) medical effects”53—precisely the 
factors of alleged use of chemical weapons to be expected from a thorough 
investigation.  
There is nothing novel or unprecedented in the findings on the tech-
nical aspects of alleged chemical weapons use. The real breakthrough here, 
as the third report itself explains, is in the determinations of responsibility 
for use given there are “no precedents for an investigation into the identifi-
cation of perpetrators, organizers, sponsors or those otherwise involved in 
the use of chemicals as weapons.”54 Investigations pursuant to the Secre-
tary-General’s Mechanism are undertaken consistently with published 
guidelines and procedures, but any such investigations are concerned solely 
with verification of whether or not chemical and/or biological weapons 
were used, not the naming of responsible parties. Even the foundational 
UNSG’s Specialist Investigative Team deployed in the 1980s to verify alle-
gations of the use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq War did not have 
an explicit mandate to determine which parties were responsible for partic-
ular incidents of chemical weapons use.55  
                                                                                                                      
51. Second Report of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons— 
United Nations Joint Investigative Mission, transmitted by Letter dated June 10, 2016 
from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. 
S/2016/530 (June 10, 2016), http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF 
CF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2016_530.pdf. 
52. Third Report of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons—
United Nations Joint Investigative Mission, transmitted by Letter dated August 24, 2016 
from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc.  
S/2016/738, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-
8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2016_738.pdf [hereinafter OPCW-JIM Third Report]. 
53. Id. ¶ 21. 
54. Id. ¶ 18. 
55. The terms of reference for the UNSG’s Specialist Investigative Team were “to de-
termine, to the extent possible, whether chemical weapons had been used, and, if so, the 
type and extent of their use.” Report of the Specialists Appointed by the Secretary-
General to Investigate Allegations by the Islamic Republic of Iran Concerning the Use of 
Chemical Weapons, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/16433 (Mar. 26, 1984). For more detail on the in-
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Of the nine investigated incidents, eight involved the use of chlorine 
and one involved the use of sulfur mustard. In three of the nine investigat-
ed incidents, the JIM found “sufficient information” to reach conclusions 
about the chemical weapon used, the means of delivery and the identity of 
the responsible party.56 In another three of the incidents the JIM “was close 
to having sufficient” information on the identity of the responsible party57; 
in the remaining three incidents there was “contradictory or insufficient” 
information about the use of chemical weapons and the means of deliv-
ery.58 In two of the three situations in which the JIM discovered sufficient 
evidence to reach its conclusions—in Talmenes (Idlib area) on April 21, 
2014 and in Sarmin (Idlib area) on March 16, 2015—the JIM concluded 
that Syrian armed forces had deployed chlorine in modified barrel bombs 
from helicopters.59 In the third incident—in Marea (Aleppo area) on Au-
gust 21, 2015—the JIM concluded that Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant 
(ISIL) forces had deployed sulfur mustard in artillery shells.60 
Following receipt of the JIM reports, including the JIM findings of Syr-
ian armed forces and ISIL use of chemical weapons, it is now up to the 
UN Security Council to decide what, if any, measures to take in response, 
including whether or not to establish an accountability mechanism to in-
vestigate which individuals were most responsible and to bring them to 
trial. The JIM findings of Syrian government use of chlorine as a weapon is 
a double novelty—the first occasion on which a State party to the CWC 
has been found to have violated its treaty obligations and the first occasion 
on which a body established by the Security Council has explicitly named 
the Syrian Government as responsible for international law violations. At 
                                                                                                                      
vestigations conducted throughout the 1980s, see Timothy L. H. McCormack, International 
Law and the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Gulf War, 21 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW JOURNAL 1 (1991). Admittedly, Saddam Hussein had bragged openly about 
his use of chemical weapons against Iran and there was little ambiguity about responsibil-
ity for the use of such weapons. The complexity of conflicts and different parties to them 
in the Syrian Crisis renders the question of responsibility for chemical weapons use signifi-
cantly more complicated that in the course of the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s. 
56. OPCW-JIM Third Report, supra note 52, ¶ 53 
57. Id. ¶ 60. 
58. Id. ¶ 71. 
59. Id. at 43 (Annex IV, Talmenes), 76 (Annex VIII, Sarmin). The JIM has not identi-
fied individuals responsible for ordering the attacks and is in no position to suggest that 
President Bashar al-Assad is personally implicated. 
60. Id. at 93 (Annex X, Marea). 
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the time of writing, the Council has not yet responded to the JIM conclu-
sions other than to extend the mandate of the JIM for another year.61 
 
III. OTHER SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW  
AND MULTILATERAL RESPONSES 
 
Tragically, egregious violations of international law have been a ubiquitous 
characteristic of the Syrian crisis from its inception. Elsewhere in this Syria 
Forum Beth Van Schaack writes more comprehensively on many of the 
recurrent war crimes perpetrated in the various conflicts that have wracked 
the country.  
 
The Syrian people have been subjected to deliberate, indiscriminate, and 
disproportionate attacks; the misuse of conventional, unconventional, and 
improvised weapons and weapon systems; industrial-grade custodial 
abuses, including deaths in detention; unrelenting siege warfare; the denial 
of humanitarian aid and what appears to be the deliberate use of starva-
tion as a weapon of war; sexual violence, including sexual enslavement of 
Yezidi women and girls and sexual torture of men and boys in detention; 
and the intentional destruction of cultural property. Thousands of Syrians 
have disappeared without a trace, many of them victims of enforced dis-
appearances. The emergence of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Le-
vant/Daesh (ISIL) introduced a new set of ruthless perpetrators who 
have brought the violence to an even more alarming level of brutality. In 
addition to war crimes under international humanitarian law (IHL), the 
Syrian people have experienced other crimes under international criminal 
law, including crimes against humanity, summary execution, terrorism 
and, potentially, genocide against ethno-religious minorities.62 
 
Van Schaack provides a detailed analysis of most of these distinct cate-
gories of offenses and there is no need to attempt to replicate her excellent 
work here. It is not immediately obvious why there has been such a rela-
tively weak multilateral response to repeated allegations of international 
crimes compared to that for chemical weapons. The disparities of approach 
cannot be explained by ignorance of the carnage. On the contrary, there 
has been extensive and protracted expenditure of effort to report on, and 
                                                                                                                      
61. S.C. Res. 2319, ¶ 1 (Nov. 17, 2016). 
62. Beth Van Schaack, Mapping War Crimes in Syria, 92 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUD-
IES. 282, 283–84 (2016).  
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to investigate, alleged offenses, as well as repeated calls for effective ac-
countability structures to prevent impunity for atrocities.  
International media outlets have been reporting on the Syrian crisis 
since the popular uprising in 2011. During Syrian government crackdowns 
in towns and villages in the initial phase of the crisis, the government 
blocked off locations of military operations from external media sources—
presumably in the hope of preventing media coverage of the efforts of Syr-
ian armed forces to suppress the protests—banned mobile phones and 
shut down Internet access in Syria.63 That strategy of excluding the media 
was successful in 1982 in relation to the military assault on Hama, but it is 
now obsolete. Smart phones are everywhere and footage from them can be 
uploaded onto the Internet almost immediately. In 2011, global media out-
lets broadcast YouTube clips from Homs, Hama, Daraa, Baniyas, Aleppo 
and other Syrian towns and cities, always with the necessary qualification 
that the outlet could not verify the video footage. But the sheer volume of 
consistent images corroborated the appalling reality of a brutal governmen-
tal crackdown. International media outlets have reported on the Syrian cri-
sis throughout its entire duration, as have other organizations located both 
within and outside Syria. The SCPR, based out of the American University 
in Beirut but clearly with extensive local contacts inside Syria, is a good ex-
ample of such an organization.64 It provides excellent analysis of the crisis, 
with detailed statistics on the devastating socio-economic impact on the 
country. The combination of reporting on, and analysis of, the crisis en-
sures a steady flow of information. 
In addition to widespread reporting on the crisis, extensive efforts con-
tinue in the investigation of alleged war crimes and crimes against humani-
ty. For example, the UN Human Rights Council established an Independ-
ent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic in 
August 2011 with a mandate “to investigate all alleged violations of interna-
tional human rights law since March 2011 in the Syrian Arab Republic.”65 
The Commission undertakes preliminary investigations and produces regu-
                                                                                                                      
63. See 10 Most Censored Countries: CPJ's New Analysis Identifies Eritrea, North Korea, Syria, 
Iran as Worst, COMMITTEE TO PROTECT JOURNALISTS (May 2, 2012), https://cpj.org 
/reports/2012/05/10-most-censored-countries.php#3 annual survey of the (listing Syria 
third, just behind Eritrea and North Korea). 
64. SYRIAN CENTER FOR POLICY RESEARCH, http://scpr-syria.org/ (last visited Sept. 
13, 2016). 
65. See Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, UN-
HCHR, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/IICISyria/Pages/IndependentInte 
rnationalCommission.aspx (last visited Sept. 13, 2016). 
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lar reports detailing its findings on “the facts and circumstances that may 
amount to such violations and of the crimes perpetrated and, where possi-
ble, to identify those responsible with a view of ensuring that perpetrators 
of violations, including those that may constitute crimes against humanity, 
are held accountable.”66 The Commission is conducting systematic investi-
gations of alleged international crimes and, in addition to its general reports 
to the Human Rights Council, it produces thematic reports on investiga-
tions into critical aspects of the Syrian crisis, including, most recently, on 
ISIL genocide of the Yazidis of Iraq67 and on summary execution and 
deaths in detention of Syrian civilians.68 Other initiatives are also ongoing 
in the gathering and preservation of evidence of international crimes which 
may be utilized for accountability purposes at some future date. For exam-
ple, the Syria Justice and Accountability Centre (SJAC), with offices in The 
Hague and Washington, D.C. and with documenters on the ground all over 
Syria, 
 
collects documentation of violations from all available sources, stores it in 
a secure database, catalogues it according to human rights standards, and 
analyzes it using legal expertise and big data methodologies. SJAC also 
supports documenters inside Syria, providing them with resources and 
technical guidance, and coordinates with other actors working toward 
similar aims: a Syria defined by justice, respect for human rights, and rule 
of law.69 
 
The establishment and ongoing work of both the Independent Interna-
tional Commission of Inquiry and the Syria Justice and Accountability Cen-
tre reflect a conviction by many that those responsible for international 
crimes in Syria should be held accountable and that impunity will not facili-
tate a transition to peace. Unfortunately for Syria, the Security Council is 
divided on the desirability of accountability. That division was exemplified 
in the joint veto by Russia and China of the draft resolution which would 
                                                                                                                      
66. Id. 
67. Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian 
Arab Republic, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/32/CRP.2 (June 15, 2016), http://www.ohchr. 
org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/CoISyria/A_HRC_32_CRP.2_en.pdf. 
68. U.N. Human Rights Council, Out of Sight, Out of Mind: Deaths in Detention in the Syri-
an Arab Republic, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/31/CRP.1 (Feb. 3, 2016), http://www.ohc 
hr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/CoISyria/A-HRC-31-CRP1_en.pdf. 
69. About Justice, SYRIA JUSTICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY CENTRE, https://syria ac-
countability.org/about/ (last visited Sept. 13, 2016). 
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have referred the alleged violations of human rights and international hu-
manitarian law (IHL) to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court 
(ICC).70 The draft resolution, co-sponsored by fifty-nine member States, 
was debated by the Council on May 22, 2014.  
The draft text recalled the Council’s full endorsement of the Geneva 
Communiqué of June 30, 2012 demanding accountability for crimes com-
mitted during the Syrian conflict; noted the reports of the International 
Independent Commission of Inquiry and the statements of the UNSG and 
the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights that international crimes 
had been committed in Syria; and referred the situation to the ICC Prose-
cutor pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Despite the thirteen af-
firmative votes, the negative votes of Russia and China prevented adoption 
of the resolution.71 Nothing has changed since 2014 to diminish the resolve 
of those two countries to continue to oppose referral of the situation to the 
ICC Prosecutor and, as Van Schaack explains, to also oppose the estab-
lishment of an ad hoc international criminal tribunal for Syria.72 
Despite the lament for lack of an effective international criminal forum 
for Syria, it is misleading to create the impression that there have been no 
substantive multilateral responses to international crimes other than in re-
sponse to the use of chemical weapons. In September 2014, the govern-
ment of Iraq wrote to the Security Council pursuant to Article 51 of the 
UN Charter advising that Iraq had invited the United States to lead strikes 
against ISIL forces because they had established a safe haven in Syria from 
where their forces were launching attacks against Iraq.73 Several States filed 
similar letters following the Iraqi letter, including the United States,74 UK,75 
                                                                                                                      
70. U.N. Doc. S/2014/348 (May 22, 2014), http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view 
_doc.asp?symbol=S/2014/348. 
71. See Press Release, Security Council, Referral of Syria to International Criminal 
Court Fails as Negative Votes Prevent Security Council from Adopting Draft Resolution, 
U.N. Press Release SC/11407 (May 22, 2014), https://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc 
11407.doc.htm.  
72. See Van Schaack, supra note 62, at 331–34. 
73. Permanent Representative of Iraq to the U.N., Letter dated September 20, 2014 
from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Presi-
dent of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2104/691 (Sept. 22, 2014). 
74. Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the U.N., Letter 
dated September 23, 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of 
America to the United States addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. S/2014/695 
(Sept. 23, 2014). 
75. Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland to the U.N., Identical letters dated November 25, 2014 from the Permanent Rep-
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Turkey,76 France77 and Australia.78 Each of those States claimed the right to 
use lethal military force against ISIL forces in Syria on the basis of Article 
51. The UK, Turkey and Australia all claimed the right of collective self-
defense of Iraq as the legal basis for undertaking aerial bombing of ISIL 
forces in Syria. France, however, additionally claimed that ISIL attacks per-
petrated against French targets gave it the right to act in its own individual 
self-defense in bombing ISIL targets in Syria. 
The increasing number of States which claimed the right of self-
defense (individual or collective in support of Iraq) against ISIL confirmed 
a widely held view that ISIL represented a significant threat to international 
peace and security. Terrorist attacks around the world for which ISIL 
claimed responsibility only fueled the growing sense that “it could be us 
next” and that it was not good enough to sit back and watch increasingly 
audacious attacks while leaving it up to others to respond. In November 
2015 the Security Council adopted Resolution 2249,79 unequivocally con-
demning ISIL’s horrifying terrorist attacks in Sousse in June 2015, in Anka-
ra in October 2015, over Sinai in October 2015, in Beirut in November 
2015 and in Paris in November 2015, and also authorizing all necessary 
measures to prevent and suppress terrorist attacks by ISIL. This was a reso-
lution Russia could agree to because it is focused not on the al-Assad re-
gime but on a key opponent of the regime. Subsequent to the adoption of 
Resolution 2249, a number of States have also written Article 51 letters, but 
with the additional legal basis of Security Council authorization. 
 
 
                                                                                                                      
resentative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United 
Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council, 
U.N. Doc. S/2014/851 (Nov. 26, 2014). 
76. Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Turkey to the U. N., Letter dat-
ed July 24, 2015 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Turkey to the 
United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. 
S/2015/563 (July 24, 2015). 
77. Permanent Representative of France to the U.N., Identical letters dated Septem-
ber 8, 2015 from the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations ad-
dressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. 
S/2015/745 (Sept. 9, 2015). 
78. Permanent Representative of Australia to the U.N., Letter dated September 9, 
2015 from the Permanent Representative of Australia to the United Nations addressed to 
the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2015/693 (Sept. 9, 2015). 
79. S.C. Res. 2249 (Nov. 20, 2015). 
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IV. EXPLAINING DISPARATE MULTILATERAL RESPONSES 
 
It is not immediately obvious why the Ghouta attack, involving as many as 
1,400 deaths, provoked the threat of a military response in Syria, while the 
deaths to that date of more than 100,000 Syrians, mostly civilians killed in 
willful attacks by al-Assad regime forces did not. President Obama charac-
terized the Ghouta attacks as “an assault on human dignity” and asked 
“what message will we send if a dictator can gas hundreds of children to 
death in plain sight and pay no price.”80 Precisely the same question could 
be asked of laying siege to cities, of artillery and rocket barrages on residen-
tial areas, and of abductions and summary executions in which many chil-
dren have also been killed. The combination of two key factors help ex-
plain responses to the use of chemical weapons in Syria: that these weap-
ons evoke a particularly visceral reaction and that the interests of both Rus-
sia and the United States coalesced in pressuring Bashar al-Assad to relin-
quish his chemical weapons capability.  
 
A. Chemical Weapons Evoke a Particularly Visceral Reaction 
 
Media outlets clearly understood that there was a big story in the Ghouta 
sarin attack. Perhaps that understanding was fueled in substantial part by 
President Obama’s “red line” statement and widespread speculation that 
the attack may have acted as a catalyst to U.S. military intervention in Syria. 
Whatever the precise rationale (or combination of rationales) for the re-
ports, the images were graphically grisly and the media response was over-
whelming. 
An alternative, or possibly an additional, explanation for the media at-
tention on the attack is the particularly visceral reaction chemical weapons 
evoke. Jackie Northam, a reporter for National Public Radio in Washing-
ton, D.C., attempted her own explanation for the extensive reaction to the 
Ghouta attack. Northam interviewed a number of experts including Grego-
ry Koblenz from the bio-defense program at George Mason University 
who claimed that “chemical weapons are part of a class of risk called 
dreaded risk. These are kinds of hazards that people have a disproportion-
                                                                                                                      
80. Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by the President (Aug. 31, 
2013), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/08/31/statement-president-s 
yria. 
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ate, psychological response to in terms of fear, anxiety, disgust.”81 Perhaps 
there is some truth in Koblenz’s analysis, but Northam queried it: 
 
[T]here are other equally terrible ways to die in an armed conflict and 
many people question why the U.S. should respond so strongly to one 
chemical weapons attack in Syria and not to other atrocities committed in 
that conflict. Why of all the horrible things that happen in warfare have 
chemical weapons been singled out?82 
 
One answer to such questions was offered by Richard Price, author of The 
Chemical Weapons Taboo,83 who asserted that “the anxiety many people feel 
about chemical weapons stems from more than just fear and revulsion.”84 
According to Northam, “Price says unlike other weapons, they’ve only 
been used a handful of times, there’s a prohibition against them, and a long 
history of political efforts to restrain their use.”85 
With respect to Price’s analysis, I do not agree that the United States 
and Russia, in compelling Syria to commit to the CWC, were motivated 
either by revulsion for the attack on the civilian population of Ghouta or 
by the fact that chemical weapons have only seldom been used, are prohib-
ited and have long been the subject of extensive efforts to restrain their 
use. Starvation as a method of warfare, for example, has also rarely been 
used and is unambiguously prohibited in both international and non-
international armed conflicts by treaty and by customary IHL.86 However, 
the utilization of starvation as a method of warfare in Syria has simply not 
evoked anything like the same substantive response as the confirmed use of 
chemical weapons. Nor do I accept that media reporting of the use of 
                                                                                                                      
81.  Jackie Northam, Why do Chemical Weapons Evoke Such a Strong Reaction?, NPR (Sept. 
4, 2013), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=218995964. 
82. Id. 
83. RICHARD M. PRICE, THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS TABOO (2007). 
84. Northam, supra note 81. 
85. Id. 
86. See, e.g., Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 54(1), June 8, 
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (prohibiting starvation as a method of warfare in international 
armed conflicts); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-international Armed Conflicts art. 14, June 
8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 (prohibiting starvation as a method of warfare in non-
international armed conflicts);  1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW r. 
53 (Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005) (asserting the prohibition 
as a customary rule of IHL in international and non-international armed conflicts alike).  
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chemical weapons captured the imagination of Washington and Moscow 
and acted as a catalyst for bilateral action. Media reports of other atrocities 
have also graphically exposed some of the horrors of the Syrian crisis and, 
on occasions, some images have evoked an outpouring of shock and dis-
may around the world. However, the media reporting of those other atroci-
ties have not provided a catalyst for substantive action and part of the ex-
planation for that surely has to do with vested national interests. 
 
B. Coalescing Interests Make for Substantive Action 
 
The United States and Russia have rarely found themselves in agreement in 
their responses to the Syrian crisis. Russia has strategic vested interests in 
Syria, not least of which is its only naval base on the Mediterranean Sea in 
the Syrian coastal city of Latakia. Russia has consistently vetoed Security 
Council initiatives to take stronger action against the al-Assad regime87 and 
has insisted instead on intervening militarily to ensure the al-Assad regime 
does not lose control of yet more Syrian territory and that it remains in 
power. However, when the United States and Russia have found their in-
terests aligned in Syria, they have been able to act effectively to produce 
substantive results. 
One such aspect of the conflict involved the use of chemical weapons. 
Both the United States and Russia are original States parties to the CWC 
and, as such, both have foregone the inclusion of chemical weapons in 
their national arsenals. Having made that commitment, neither country de-
sires proliferation of chemical weapons or the emergence of a situation in 
which their respective armed forces face possible exposure to such weap-
ons. The United States, in particular, purportedly justified its invasion of 
Iraq to disarm Saddam Hussein of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 
and led an international coalition of States ostensibly to finally rid Iraq of 
its alleged WMD stockpiles. The invasion of Iraq and subsequent search 
for alleged stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction was the catalyst for 
                                                                                                                      
87. See, e.g., Julian Borger & Bastien Inzaurralde, Russian Vetoes are Putting UN Security 
Council Legitimacy at Risk, Says US, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 23, 2015), https://www.theg 
uardian.com/world/2015/sep/23/russian-vetoes-putting-un-security-council-legitimacy-
at-risk-says-us (referring to four draft Security Council resolutions vetoed by Russia). More 
recently, Russia vetoed another draft resolution on October 8, 2016. See Julian Borger, 
Russia Vetoes UN Resolution to Stop Bombing of Aleppo, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 8, 2016), http 
s://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/08/russia-vetoes-un-resolution-syria-bomb 
ing-aleppo. For the text of the draft resolution, see U.N. Doc. S/2016/846 (Oct. 8, 2016).  
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ongoing devastation for Iraq and a slight on United States foreign policy. 
One can imagine the United States would be keen to intervene earlier in 
the process of chemical weapon development and/or acquisition in the 
hope of avoiding yet another drawn-out experience of attempting to con-
tain the spread of weapons of mass destruction. 
Another aspect of the crisis in Syria in which Russian and United States 
interests have coalesced involves the rise of ISIL and the desire to combine 
forces to erode ISIL capacity. ISIL sympathizers around the world are un-
dertaking acts of brutality that have challenged many societies and the pro-
spects are only that attempts to perpetrate audacious attacks will persist. 
Quite apart from establishment of the self-declared caliphate in Syria and 
Iraq and the instability that brings for the sovereignty of both nations, 
there is a growing acknowledgement of the stark reality that allowing ISIL 
to prosper in Syria and in Iraq is a recipe for disaster in many other coun-
tries around the world. The United States and Russia readily agree on this 
and so substantive multilateral action has followed. 
 
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
A. Strengthening the Legal Prohibition on the Use of Chemical Weapons 
 
Out of the abject mire of the Syrian crisis some would argue that one posi-
tive—a lone, shining light—has been the international community’s reaf-
firmation of the normative prohibition on the use of chemical weapons. 
After all, the al-Assad regime was convinced to accede to the CWC, declare 
the existence of its chemical weapons program and to surrender its chemi-
cal stockpile, its means of delivery and its production facilities for destruc-
tion, a process all verified by OPCW inspectors. In so doing, Syria became 
the 190th State party to the CWC.88 Strategically, at least in terms of the 
goal of universal adherence to the normative prohibition, Syrian participa-
tion in the CWC brought a major chemical weapons-capable State into the 
treaty regime with the potential to influence the subsequent participation of 
other key non-States parties. Both Israel and Egypt, for example, have jus-
tified their respective non-participation in the CWC on the refusal of other 
regional States to accede to the treaty and, in Egypt’s case, also on Israel’s 
                                                                                                                      
88. There are now 192 States parties to the CWC. Myanmar and Angola have both 
acceded to the treaty since Syria. OPCW Member States, OPCW, https://www.opcw.or 
g/about-opcw/member-states/ (last visited Sept. 13, 2016). 
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refusal to relinquish its nuclear weapons capability.89 This “regional non-
participation” argument may be more difficult to sustain now that Syria is a 
party to the CWC.90 
I have already argued that the catalyst for unprecedented multilateral, 
and particularly U.S.-Russian bilateral, action in Syria had much less to do 
with the humanitarian catastrophe in the country and much more to do 
with a shared bilateral commitment to preventing a re-emergence of chem-
ical weapons. Having renounced their use, neither the United States nor 
Russia wants other States to use them and, in so doing, challenge the stig-
ma attached to the normative prohibition on chemical weapons.  
Despite the investigations and publicly released findings of the UN-
OPCW JIM, which might have been expected to have induced an end to 
alleged use of chemical weapons in Syria, allegations of the ongoing use of 
chlorine dropped in barrel bombs91 from Syrian armed forces helicopters 
continue at an alarmingly frequent rate.92 Of course, each of those incidents 
warrant careful investigation before an unequivocal assertion can be made 
that chlorine is still being used as a weapon in Syria. But the repeated alle-
gations are disconcerting in light of previous developments. Syria now has 
the dubious “honor” of becoming the first CWC State party in which 
chemical weapons use has been confirmed. It would be ironic indeed if the 
end result of chemical weapons use in Syria is a weakening of the global 
normative prohibition by virtue of a State party to the CWC—one of the 
newest members of the treaty regime no less—being seen to have repeated-
                                                                                                                      
89. See Egypt Refusing to Sign WMD Treaties, JERUSALEM POST (May 13, 2009, http://w 
ww.jpost.com/Middle-East/Egypt-refusing-to-sign-WMD-treaties; Barak Ravid, Israel 
Adamant it Won’t Ratify Chemical Arms Treaty Before Hostile Neighbors, HAARETZ (Sept. 12, 
2013), http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-1.546613.  
90. See, e.g., Edmund Sanders, Israel Also Facing Questions about Chemical Weapons, LOS 
ANGELES TIMES (Sept. 12, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/sep/12/world/la-fg-
wn-israel-chemical-weapons-20130912. 
91. Simon Cotton, Syria Chlorine Attack Claims: What This Chemical Is and How it Became 
a Weapon, THE CONVERSATION (Sept. 8, 2016), http://theconversation.com/syria-
chlorine-attack-claims-what-this-chemical-is-and-how-it-became-a-weapon-65068.  
92. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. But see Ambassador Michele Sison, U.S. 
Deputy Representative to the United Nations, Remarks before the UN Security Council: 
Explanation of the Vote for UN Security Council 2314 on the Renewal of the Joint Inves-
tigative Mechanism (transcript available at https://usun.state.gov/remarks/7521) (observ-
ing that in the year since the JIM was first established, there was a substantial reduction in 
the number of reported incidents of chemical weapons attacks (down from one hundred 
in the year prior to the JIM’s establishment to twelve during the year following its crea-
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ly violated the treaty prohibition with impunity. If that is the end result, 
some may question whether it would have been better for the United States 
and Russia not to have compelled Syria to join the CWC. At least then the 
use of chemical weapons could have been condemned as a violation of a 
customary norm of international law perpetrated on the territory of a non-
State party to the CWC by government armed forces and by non-State 
armed groups, thus preserving the integrity of the treaty regime. 
 
B. Global Criminal Justice Still Has a Long Way to Go 
 
Early in 2015, the then Israeli Foreign Minister, Avigdor Lieberman, was 
quoted criticizing the ICC Prosecutor, Fatou Besouda, for opening a pre-
liminary examination into the situation in Palestine, but not one for Syria.93 
Lieberman alleged an anti-Israel bias given the Prosecutor’s apparent indif-
ference to the then more than 200,000 dead resulting from the Syrian con-
flict. Lieberman’s criticism reflected a comprehensive misunderstanding of 
the limitations to the ICC’s jurisdiction.  
In the absence of a Security Council referral of the Syrian situation to 
the Prosecutor, the ICC has no jurisdiction over alleged violations of the 
Rome Statute94 perpetrated on the physical territory of Syria unless the 
conduct in question is perpetrated by nationals of a State party to the 
Rome Statute, either government armed forces intervening in Syria or for-
eign fighters who are nationals of State parties. Lieberman was correct on 
one basic level though. The Syrian crisis has been characterized by such 
appalling international crimes that the situation should be within the remit 
of the ICC Prosecutor. The fact that Syria has not been referred to the 
Prosecutor is not because the notion has not been contemplated. As dis-
cussed earlier, France presented a draft resolution to the Security Council 
which would have referred the Syrian situation, but the draft was vetoed by 
Russia and China.95  
Van Schaack has explained in detail that aspects of the Syrian crisis 
might present problems for the ICC given some of the limitations of the 
subject matter jurisdiction in the Rome Statute and she provides a compel-
ling argument for an ad hoc international criminal tribunal to overcome 
                                                                                                                      
93. See Jonathan Lis, ICC Opens Initial Probe into Possible War Crimes in Palestinian Territo-
ries, HAARETZ (Jan. 16, 2015), http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/1.637518. 
94. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 
90.  
95. See supra notes 70–71 and accompanying text. 
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some of those limitations.96 But as Van Schaack concedes, Russian opposi-
tion to any accountability processes (ICC or other) for al-Assad regime 
supporters (including Russian military personnel) is unshakeable. The rest 
of the international community lacks the political will to establish any such 
mechanism in the face of such strident opposition.  
The reality, unpalatable though it is for some, is that the ICC does not 
represent a comprehensive and systematic mechanism for achieving inter-
national criminal justice and is dependent upon the support and commit-
ment of the international community to render it effective. The constant 
refrain of the UNSG, the OPCW, the UN Human Rights Council and the 
Security Council that “those responsible must be held accountable” has a 
hollowness about it in the face of inefficacious challenges to Russian and 
Chinese opposition.  
 
C. Responsibility to Protect Takes a Hit 
 
The relatively weak Security Council reactions to the Syrian crisis and Rus-
sian determination to veto any attempt by the Council to impose substan-
tive measures against the Assad regime may not only have weakened ad-
herence to the prohibition on the use of chemical weapons and demon-
strated the inadequacy of the existing global criminal justice system, but 
also raise serious questions for the emerging responsibility to protect (R2P) 
doctrine. Given the rationale for the doctrine (which I will address shortly), 
the Syrian crisis exposes some profound limitations to its efficacy. In dis-
cussing lessons from the 2011 NATO intervention in Libya, Gareth Evans 
claimed that: 
 
The question on many minds, not least my own, has been whether this 
represents a serious setback for the responsibility to protect norm, giving 
new traction to those who would seek to not only undermine but reverse 
everything that has been achieved over the past decade. Or does it just re-
flect the degree of difficulty and controversy that is absolutely bound to 
be present—as I for one have always acknowledged—whenever the 
hardest and sharpest instrument in the RtoP response toolbox, coercive 
military action, is called in aid.97 
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These are important questions to ask. Proponents of the R2P doctrine 
celebrated the Security Council’s adoption of Resolution 197398—the high-
water mark of multilateral implementation of the doctrine. But the morph-
ing of NATO’s interpretation of the Council’s mandate—that the only way 
Libya’s civilians could be protected was to ensure a military victory and the 
removal of Gaddafi from office99—was controversial and hardened the re-
solve of some not to allow a repeat reinterpretation of a Security Council 
mandate in the case of Syria. 
A preliminary issue for international lawyers though is the characteriza-
tion of the status of the R2P doctrine as a “norm.” The doctrine was ini-
tially articulated in the 2001 report of the International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) entitled The Responsibility to Pro-
tect. The report was predicated on two “Basic Principles”: 
 
A. State sovereignty implies responsibility, and the primary responsibility 
for the protection of its people lies with the state itself.  
 
B. Where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal 
war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is 
unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention 
yields to the international responsibility to protect.100 
 
The ICISS, created by then Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axwor-
thy, was constituted with the appointment of a group of leading interna-
tional experts each acting in their individual capacities. As such, the Com-
mission could not, and certainly did not purport to be attempting to, create 
legally binding obligations. Rather, the report was an attempt to reframe 
the humanitarian intervention debate and to identify common ground for 
the protection of “people at risk.” Perhaps the major contribution of the 
ICISS’s report was the proposition of sovereignty as a “dual responsibility: 
externally—to respect the sovereignty of other states, and internally, to re-
spect the dignity and basic rights of all the people within the state. In inter-
                                                                                                                      
98. S.C. Res. 1973 (Mar. 17, 2011). 
99. For a detailed analysis of the morphing of NATO’s interpretation of the Security 
Council mandate, see Spencer Zifcak, The Responsibility to Protect after Libya and Syria, 13 
MELBOURNE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 59 (2012). 
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national human rights covenants, in UN practice, and in state practice it-
self, sovereignty is now understood as embracing this dual responsibil-
ity.”101 Gareth Evans, a key architect of the report, characterized the ap-
proach of the Commission as turning “the notion of the ‘right to intervene’ 
upside down. Talk not about the ‘right’ of big states to do anything, but the 
responsibility of all states to protect their own people from atrocity crimes, 
and to help others to do so.”102 
The publication of the ICISS’s report proved highly influential, engen-
dering a global discourse on national and international responsibilities for 
the protection of people from the perpetration of international crimes. The 
UN General Assembly adopted both the notion and the gist of R2P in its 
2005 World Summit Outcomes Document by declaring, in relevant part, 
that: 
 
Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations 
from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. 
This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their 
incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that re-
sponsibility and will act in accordance with it. The international commu-
nity should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this re-
sponsibility and support the United Nations in establishing an early warn-
ing capability. 
 
The international community, through the United Nations, also has the 
responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other 
peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, 
to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing 
and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take col-
lective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security 
Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a 
case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations 
as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national au-
thorities manifestly fail to protect their populations from genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. We stress the need 
for the General Assembly to continue consideration of the responsibility 
to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 
crimes against humanity and its implications, bearing in mind the princi-
ples of the Charter and international law. We also intend to commit our-
selves, as necessary and appropriate, to helping States build capacity to 
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protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 
crimes against humanity and to assisting those which are under stress be-
fore crises and conflicts break out.103 
 
The following year the Security Council endorsed the General Assem-
bly’s approach to R2P. In Resolution 1674 the Council reaffirmed “the 
provisions of paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome 
Document regarding the responsibility to protect populations from geno-
cide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.”104 Conse-
quently, within just five years of the publication of the ICISS report, both 
the UN’s plenary body and its executive organ had endorsed the “sover-
eignty as responsibility” approach of the Commission. 
The international community did not have long to wait for a major test 
of its resolve to ensure effective implementation of the R2P doctrine. Libya 
was not spared its own domestic version of the Arab Spring, but the re-
sponse of the regime of Muammar Gaddafi was particularly swift and bru-
tal. On or around February 15, 2011, Gaddafi declared war on insurrection 
and unleashed his military forces on his own civilian population. Casualties 
mounted rapidly and the responding chorus of international condemnation 
was unusually rapid, unified and vocal. The Arab League, the Organisation 
of Islamic Cooperation and the African Union all condemned the violence 
and, on February 22, 2011, the Arab League went so far as to suspend Lib-
ya’s membership.105 The UN Human Rights Council met on February 25 
and decided to establish and deploy an independent international commis-
sion of inquiry to investigate alleged human rights violations in Libya.106 
The UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1970 on February 26, de-
manded “an immediate end to the violence” and referred the situation in 
Libya to the ICC Prosecutor for investigation of alleged international 
crimes.107  
                                                                                                                      
103. 2005 World Summit Outcome, U.N. Doc. A/60/L.1, ¶¶ 138–39 (Sept. 15, 
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Attacks on civilians escalated and Gaddafi forces surrounded Bengha-
zi—Libya’s second major city and the base of the rebel movement—as 
Gaddafi threatened a massacre.108 On March 17, just over a month after the 
eruption of violence, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1973.109 In it 
the Council expressed its determination “to ensure the protection of civil-
ians and civilian populated areas”110 and authorized “all necessary measures 
. . . to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in 
the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi,”111 as well as to enforce a 
no-fly zone in Libya to prevent Gaddafi’s attacks on civilians from the 
air.112 On the basis of the Resolution, NATO initiated an aerial bombing 
campaign against Gaddafi’s forces and it is clear that this forceful interven-
tion prevented a large-scale massacre in Benghazi.  
But the implementation of a Security Council resolution such as 1973 
does not constitute the emergence of a customary norm of international 
law—especially one on military intervention in the absence of Security 
Council authorization. Gareth Evans has acknowledged as much: 
 
[I]t would have been premature in 2005, and still is now, to describe the 
responsibility to protect as a new rule of customary law. It may become 
one, but that will depend upon how comprehensively this new concept is 
implemented and applied in practice, as well as recognised in principle, in 
the years ahead. But with the weight behind it of a unanimous General 
assembly resolution at head of state and governmental level, the respon-
sibility to protect could already in 2005 properly be described as a new in-
ternational norm, not just an emerging norm: a new standard of behavior, 
and a new guide to behavior, for every state.113 
 
The Syrian crisis represents a profound challenge to the R2P doctrine. 
There are, of course, substantial international military interventions in Syr-
ia—by Russia in support of government forces against organized armed 
groups fighting against the Assad regime and by the United States and oth-
er Western allies against ISIS forces. Those interventions have not resulted 
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in protection of the lives of the civilian population of Syria. Any progress 
that proponents of the R2P doctrine assume had been made in the Libyan 
context seems to have evaporated in the lack of multilateral response to the 
Syrian crisis. 
 
D. Disparate Responses are not so Disparate 
 
International Law as a constraint on the conduct of parties to the armed 
conflicts in Syria—what Martti Koskeniemii has coined the “gentle civilizer 
of nations”114—seems to have had little effect over the past six years. In-
stead, the conflicts have been replete with egregious violations of interna-
tional law and characterized by compounding human misery. A tragic irony 
for the Syrian population is that despite all the international rhetoric about 
determination not to tolerate the use of chemical weapons and of President 
Obama’s “red line” statement, even the confirmed use of chemical weap-
ons has failed to provoke a massive military intervention to end the carnage 
in Syria. I do not wish to suggest that massive military intervention could 
or would stop the carnage in Syria. Russian military engagement on the side 
of the al-Assad regime complicates any suggestion of intervention on be-
half of the civilian population. However, the strategic military and political 
complexities of the Syrian crisis underscore some of the limitations of the 
responsibility to protect doctrine. In these particular circumstances, where 
the national State has monumentally failed to meet its principal responsibil-
ity for the protection of its own population, the international community 
has been precluded from stepping in to undertake any effective supplemen-
tary protective role.  
It is surely of little comfort to Syrian victims to be told that because 
their son was killed by exposure to chlorine or to sarin that the internation-
al community takes his death more seriously than the death of a neighbor’s 
son from artillery shells pounding a civilian residential apartment building. 
Nor must it be of any comfort that some wounded civilians died as a result 
of a war crime because the hospital in which they were patients was delib-
erately targeted, whereas other patients did not die from a war crime be-
cause the hospital they were in was mistakenly hit. While the Security 
Council and the OPCW have deployed JIM investigators into Syria to de-
termine which parties to the conflicts are responsible for chemical weapons 
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use, the UN Human Rights Commission’s International Independent 
Commission of Inquiry and the Syria Justice and Accountability Centre are 
required to undertake their work of documenting and investigating alleged 
international crimes outside the country with whatever contacts they can 
access from within Syria. But, in relation to both the JIM and the other two 
mechanisms, there is as yet no capacity to lay charges against particular in-
dividuals or to hold them accountable. As Beth Van Schaack so eloquently 
explains, all these measures are undertaken in the hope that at some future 
stage there may be an international criminal forum with jurisdiction over 
the appalling crimes which have been committed.115 It is in this sense that 
the responses to the use of chemical weapons are not as disparate to those 
for all other atrocities as first appearances suggest. 
Some parties to some conflicts in Syria are attempting to comply with 
IHL in the conduct of their military operations knowing that some other 
parties have no intention of even pretending to comply with the law. That 
is a challenging situation to confront and I sincerely hope that those States 
committed to complying with the law are not dissuaded from doing so. A 
former Australian general claims that situations in which an adversary has 
no intention of complying with the law is precisely the scenario where 
 
[t]he potential is greatest for the lines of morality to be crossed. In such 
circumstances, operations are viewed through a lens that might lead 
someone to believe the “end justifies the means.” But the concept of 
beating the opponent “at his own game” can lead otherwise moral people 
to commit immoral acts. When nation-states decide to employ the tactics 
of their non-state adversaries, a descent to the lowest standards of con-
duct is inevitable. The proliferation of this attitude increases the risk that 
moral ascendancy will be lost. It is also the moment when the very cause 
a nation chooses to fight can be forsaken. The greatest danger is that the 
side seeking moral ascendancy morphs into the enemy they have pledged 
to oppose.116 
 
As laudable as those efforts to comply with the law in the face of egre-
gious and routine violations are, the Syrian crisis represents a significant 
normative challenge to IHL. Condemnation of atrocities in Syria un-
matched by efforts to hold responsible individuals accountable has the po-
tential to reinforce impunity for those regimes protected from global justice 
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structures by permanent members of the Security Council. This is as much 
a reality for the repeated demands that those responsible for the use of 
chemical weapons be held accountable as it is for other egregious violations 
of IHL. And the long-suffering civilian population of Syria is surely entitled 
to ask penetrating questions about the purported efficacy of regimes for 
the enforcement of international law. For those benighted people, interna-
tional law itself must seem illusory.  
  
  
